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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of Labor Laws throughout the world is principally 
influenced by models of current Industrial Relations in each of the respective 
countries. Generally, there are two models of industrial relations which influence 
the development of labor laws. The first is the Corporatist Model or Regulatory 
Model and the second is the Contractual Model1. The former is a model of industrial 
relations where the role of Government is very high in labor–management relations. 
All employment terms and working conditions are regulated completely by the 
Government through labor regulations. In this model it becomes a minimum 
standard in so far as it regulates labor rights and it becomes a maximum standard 
in so far as it regulates labor obligations. In this case the employees and employers 
only have rights to bargain the employment terms and working conditions above the 
minimum standard. Therefore, neither party to the negotiation is permitted to 
negotiate terms that are below the minimum standard. An individual labor contract 
or Collective Labor Agreement will be null when it violates the labor statutes or 
labor regulations. In these conditions, it is reasonable to say that labor law is 
compulsory and becomes a part of the Public Law2 of a country. This is common in 
countries which follow a Civil Law System, such as France, The Netherlands, 
Germany, and of course Indonesia.  
The later is a model of industrial relations where the role of Government is 
very low or limited. In this model, the government is not overly involved in the 
enactment of employment terms and working conditions. Essentially, the 
government limits its role to regulation of occupational and safety health only. All 
employment terms and working conditions are negotiated by the employees or their 
labor union representatives and the employer. It means that in a contractual model, 
the majority of the labor law is based on contract. Simply, under this  model the 
parties have the freedom to regulate employment terms and working conditions 
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based on their respective interests. From the legal system point of view, in this 
situation labor law is voluntary and becomes part of Private Law3. This model 
prevails in most Common Law Systems, such as the United States of America, Great 
Britain, Australia, and Malaysia. 
Based on the theories of Industrial Relations mentioned above, the main 
question this paper seeks to address is how has the reformation of Indonesian Labor 
Law progressed in general? But specifically what has been the state of labor law 
reform since 1998?  
The first part of this paper addresses the development of Indonesian labor 
law so as to provide a context for those ideas and mechanisms that have influenced 
this development. This will then provide the relevant context for more detailed 
analysis of the post 1998 labor law reform program.  
This paper will be divided into three parts. The first is simply the 
introduction and will focus on the influences of industrial relations on the 
development of labor law in general. The second part will focus on labor law 
development prior to 1998. In this part the focus will be on how the Indonesian labor 
law model moved from the contractual model to the corporatist model, particularly 
in the period after independence was achieved in 1945. Finally, the last part will 
focus on post-1998 labor law developments and reform. In this part the paper focuses 
on the theoretical shift back to the contract model despite the reality that in practice 
the model very much remains the corporatist or regulatory model. 
 
II.  INDONESIAN LABOR LAW before 1998 
 
Before 1998 the model of industrial relations in Indonesia was the corporatist 
model or regulatory model. It meant that Government intervention in labor relations 
was very high. It is fair to say that the manner in which employment terms and 
working conditions were regulated were “from the cradle to the grave”. In a context 
such as this Indonesian Labor Law was obviously a part of Public Law and this is 
reinforced by the fact that labor regulations were enacted by Government. Both 
employers and employees were obliged to obey the government labor regulations 
otherwise they will be punished either with terms of imprisonment or substantial 
fines.  
The strong influence of the corporatist or regulatory model on the Indonesian 
labor law had already occurred long before Indonesia became an independent state. 
This model is evident in the Colonial labor laws of the Dutch East Indies 
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Administration and at this point the model was clearly within the field of Public 
Law. However, this was not absolute as some elements were characterized as being 
within the field of the Private Law. After independence, the state’s intervention in 
labor-management relations started to become more dominant. In consideration of 
the increasing dominance of government in the labor-management paradigm it is 
reasonable to say that labor relations were moving from the contractual model to the 
corporatist model.     
For instance Law No. 647 of 1925 on Restrictions against Child Labor and 
Night Work for Women explicitly regulated that a women may not perform work 
between 10.00 p.m. and 5 a.m., except where this was permitted by or under a 
decision of the Governor General. This law also prohibited any child under 12 
(twelve) years of age from working on railways or tramways and the loading, 
unloading, and removal of goods in harbors, railway stations, except carrying by 
hand4.  
After Indonesia achieved independence the intervention of government 
remains strong. This is evident in Law No. 1 of 1951 on Employment Law which 
regulated working hours, annual leave, long service leave, rights such as 
menstruation leave and maternity leave, child labor rights, and work-place 
conditions. The employer has to comply with the law and therefore facilitate the 
provision of the labor rights stipulated in the law. The failure to comply would give 
rise to threats of imprisonment or substantial fines. It is in this law that the concept 
of twelve working days of annual leave became a standard for employers and this is 
a standard that persists until today. However, this was a minimum standard that 
employees and employers could negotiate to a higher level but not to a level less 
than the 12-day minimum. In the event employees and employers did negotiate an 
individual or collective labor agreement or company regulation which stipulated an 
arrangement where annual leave was less than the 12-day minimum then the 
agreement would be deemed to be null or void5.  
Law No. 2 of 1951 on Employment Accidents obligates the employer to pay 
compensation to any worker who suffers a work-place accident irrespective of 
whether the accident is the fault of the employee. The employer is also obligated to 
report the work-place accident to the relevant Department of Labor official within 24 
(twenty four) hours of the accident occurring. Failure to report work-place accidents 
will make the employer liable to terms of imprisonment or fines6.  
Law No. 3 of 1951 on Labor Supervision gave authority to Labor Inspectors to 
supervise the enforcement of the labor law and to investigate punishable offenses. In 
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reality this meant that the labor inspector was not only authorized to prosecute 
breaches of the provisions of the labor law and regulations but was also authorized 
to actively prevent potential breaches of the provisions of the labor law and 
regulations through the socialization of the labor law to both employees and 
employers7. 
Law No. 21 of 1954 on Collective Labor Agreements stipulated that only 
accredited and registered unions had a right to enter into collective bargaining 
negotiations on behalf of their members. Therefore, to be effective each union had to 
register their existence with the authorized Department of Labor official in order to 
exercise the right to bargain collectively. The value of accreditation and registration 
was that any collective labor agreement between an unregistered union and an 
employer was deemed to be null and void at law8.  
According to Ministerial Regulation No. 90 of 1955 on Trade Union 
Registration all unregistered trade unions are deemed illegal unions. The Regulation 
grants the government the authority to dismiss or to postpone unregistered unions9. 
Furthermore, more recent regulations such as Ministerial Degree No. 1 of 1975 on 
Trade Union Registration stipulates that a Trade Union can be registered where it 
has 1 Union Chapter at the National Level, and 15 branches of the union at the 
District Level, and 1,000 unions at the Plant Level10. It is evident based on these 
conditions that the theory of registering is easier than the practice, Simply, the 
conditions to register a union were purposively difficult to register a union and even 
more difficult to contemplate registering a new union. The purpose of such 
restrictive conditions was to ensure that Indonesia was in essence a one union 
country. The difficulty in registering new trade unions meant that it was 
considerably easier for the government to control union activities when it only had to 
deal with one union. It was hoped and expected that this type of union control would 
limit industrial action and the development of an active and aggressive labor union. 
This over control of the union meant that the right or freedom to associate was non-
existent at this time, at least as it applied to Indonesian labor.    
Furthermore, according to Law No. 22 of 1957 on Labor Dispute Settlement it 
is stipulated that all  labor disputes are to be resolved amicably if possible. However, 
where the amicable negotiations break down or fail then the parties are to secure 
the services of an accredited mediator or conciliator to resolve the case. In the event 
that the mediator or conciliator fails to resolve the dispute then the parties can ask 
the Labor Dispute Settlement Committee at the regional level to resolve the case. If 
one of the parties is not satisfied with the decision of the Committee at the regional 
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level, then that party may appeal to the Labor Dispute Settlement Committee at the 
national level. Both the committees, national and regional levels, are chaired by 
government. At the regional level the chair was held by the Head of the relevant 
Department of Labor Regional Office. At the national level the committee was 
chaired by a relevant authorized official of the Head Office of the Department of 
Labor11. In effect this was compulsory arbitration managed and administered by the 
government. It is easy to see that the level of government intervention in the dispute 
resolution process was very high. This Law changed the labor dispute settlement 
mechanisms that were regulated in the Ordinance on Arbitration, Staatsblaad No. 
52 of 1847 from the Dutch Colonial period. This ordinance permitted labor disputes 
to be resolved through voluntary arbitration or through the court without 
intervention from the government (Department of Labor)12. This means to all intents 
and purposes there was no government intervention is the dispute resolution process 
in the Dutch Colonial Period.  
Law No. 22 of 1957 on Labor Dispute Settlement further stipulated that all 
planned strikes or lock-outs had to first obtain the permission of the government 
before they may be undertaken, in this case the Board of Labor Disputes Settlement. 
In this scenario any strike or lock-out that did not obtain the requisite permissions 
was to be classified as an illegal strike or lock-out and there were consequences for 
holding illegal industrial actions. It is worth noting at this juncture that the all 
pervasive intervention of government in labor relations saw that during this period 
not a single permit was issued for a strike or lock-out to take place.   
Pursuant to Law No. 12 of 1964 on the Termination of Employment in the 
Private Sector, employers were prohibited from terminating an employee because of 
illness or the employees’ participation in an industrial action or with respect to the 
completion or fulfillment of an obligation to the State. Similarly, where employees 
had to first obtain permission to undertake industrial action employers were also 
required to obtain permission from the relevant Labor Dispute Settlement 
Committee before a termination may be validly made of an employee.  If the 
employer failed to obtain the requisite permission to terminate then any termination 
effected against an employee would be deemed void at law13. As was previously 
noted in the discussion on Law No. 22 of 1957 the Committee system was in fact 
tantamount to compulsory arbitration chaired by government, which in turn meant 
that the government also was to play a significant and pervasive role in matters 
relating to the termination of employees. Simply, the legality of any termination was 
at the complete and sole discretion of the government as all terminations had to be 
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approved by the relevant committee first. This is no longer the case as the 
enactment of Article 1603p of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-undang 
Hukum Pe data / KUHPer) as an employer now possesses the authority to terminate 
an employee with 1 month notice prior to the date of termination or immediately if 
the required compensation is paid to the terminated employee. This means that the 
employer has the authority to terminate directly and without notice
r
14. This means 
that a termination of employment can be effected without the involvement of the 
government where both the employee and the employer agree to the terms and 
conditions of that termination.    
According to Law No. 1 of 1970 on Labor Safety, employers are obliged to 
provide occupational health and safety equipment to their workers. For instance an 
employer shall provide safety tools, safety shoes, masks, goggles, and helmets, 
among other tools and equipment15. The goal of this law is to prevent work accidents 
or occupational illness. Any breach of these provisions means that the employer 
becomes liable for a term of imprisonment or for a fine.  This is reflective of the very 
deep intervention that the government has into the work-placed occupational health 
and safety controls.  
Additionally, Government Regulation No. 8 of 1981 on Wages Protection 
requires that an employer pay wages to their employee even where the employee is 
absent from work where this absence is beyond the control of the employee. Some of 
these instances beyond the control of the employee include sickness, marriage, death, 
or complete an official State assignment, among others. Employers are required to 
pay their sick workers a decreasing proportion of their salary over a 12-month period. 
It is only at the conclusion of this 12-month period that the employer may terminate 
the employee. The decreasing proportional payment scale is 100% of an employees 
wage for the first 3 months and this is to decrease by 25% for each further 3-month 
period the employee remains sick. Therefore, for months 4-6 the employee receives 
75%, months 7-9 the employee receives 50%, and for months 10-12 the employee 
receives 25% of their normal salary. It is worth noting that the ‘no work, no pay’ 
principle is not absolute and this is because the government maintains the ability to 
intervene in this area.  
According to Law No. 3 of 1992 on Social Security, an employer who employs 
more than 10 workers or pays salaries of more than Rp. 1,000,000 are required to 
register and become a member of the social security system. Similar to previously 
noted sanctions, any failure by the employer to comply with these provisions exposes 
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the employer to a term of imprisonment or a fine17. This means that the role of 
government in the social security sector is as the dominant player. 
 
III. INDONESIA LABOR  LAW REFORM after 1998 
 
 As a developing country the two biggest obstacles facing Indonesia are the 
lack of capital and the lack of technology. These obstacles demand that Indonesia 
attract foreign capital investment to facilitate and support economic growth and 
prosperity. Traditionally, the means of attracting foreign capital investment was to 
offer an environment that permitted the use of cheap, and often under-age, labor. 
This pro-investment environment was also one that historically was weak on 
enforcement meaning that even where pro-employee regulations were in place these 
could often be ignored with almost absolute immunity from the authorities. 
Unfortunately, foreign capital investors tended to exploit the generosity of 
developing countries and the returns that the developing countries were expecting 
never materialized on the scales they considered necessary. Even so this ability of 
developing countries to provide cheap labor and no law enforcement and the 
apparent complicity in this exploitation has been characterized as ‘social dumping’. 
Despite considerable efforts to ensure the inclusion of social clauses in WTO (World 
Trade Organization) conference pronouncements has so far failed to materialize. 
 Based on the fact that this dilemma continues unabated, Indonesia has found 
itself caught between a need to exploit any competitive advantage that is has and a 
desire to put in a labor regulatory framework that would reduce and erase this 
comparative advantage over time. This decision is complicated further by the fact 
that developed countries have not maintained any real consistency in how they 
approach the needs of developing countries. This inconsistency manifests itself in 
developed countries actively seeking out cheap labor and poor law enforcement and 
then claiming that developing countries are engaging in social dumping and 
violating the human rights of their citizens.  
During the period between 1994 and 1997, Indonesia was under increasing 
levels of domestic and international pressure from labor organizations to recognize 
what were considered to be fundamental labor and human rights, such as freedom of 
association. These labor movements had considerable success in socializing the 
rights that labor have and are entitled to enjoy including the right to join a trade 
union and the right to bargain collectively for better employment terms and 
conditions.  
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The domestic and international pressure being applied to Indonesia and other 
developing countries was to ensure the movement from the corpora ist model to the 
contractual model. The failure, noted earlier, to incorporate a social clause into WTO 
Conference pronouncements, encouraged developing nations to aggressively pursue 
the ILO (International Labor Organization) to force the application of the 8 ILO 
Core Convention concerning the Fundamental Rights of Workers. In 1998, the ILO 
declared that all the members of the ILO must enforce the 8 ILO Core Conventions 
irrespective of whether they have already ratified them or not
t
18. The increasing 
pressure saw Indonesia ratify 5 of these Core Conventions in the period after 1998: 
1. Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Rights to Organize and which was ratified in Presidential Decree No. 
83 of 1998. 
2. Convention No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor and which was 
ratified in Law No. 19 of 1999. 
3. Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment and which is ratified in Law No. 20 of 1999. 
4. Convention No. 111 on Discrimination in Respect of Employment and 
Occupation and which is ratified in Law No. 21 of 1999. 
5. Convention No. 182 on the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor and which is ratified in 
Law No. 1 of 2000. 
By ratifying these 5 ILO Core Conventions, Indonesia has become the first 
country in Asia to ratify all 8 of the Core Conventions. The remaining 3 of these Core 
Conventions were ratified prior to 1998: 
1. Convention No. 29 on Forced or Compulsory Labor which was ratified 
in Law No. 261 of 1933. 
2. Convention No. 89 on the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organize and to Bargain Collectively which was ratified in Law No. 18 
of 1956. 
3. Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value which was ratified in Law No. 80 of 
1957. 
The ratification of ILO Core Convention No. 87 of 1949 followed by the 
promulgation of Law No. 21 of 2000 on Trade Unions ensured that Indonesia 
changed from being a Single Union System to that of a Multi Union System. 
According to Law, every worker now had a right to form or to become a member of a 
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trade union. Some of the overly onerous conditions of the past were repealed 
meaning that a trade union could be formed with at least 10 like-minded individuals 
deciding to do so. The obligations for union registration were removed19. Although 
registration was no longer required there remained a requirement to notify the 
establishment of a new trade union to the authorized Department of Labor official. 
The practical implication of the enactment of this provision was that a company may 
have a multitude of trade unions operating concurrently within its work place. Prior 
to the enactment of Law No. 21 of 2000 no single union could be legally established 
in Indonesia except for SPSI or FBSI and both of these were sponsored by 
government. The above approved unions, SPSI (All Indonesian Labor Union) the 
former FBSI (All Indonesian Labor Federation), meant that Indonesia was subject to 
constant international criticism for its failure to allow greater freedom of association 
with respect to unionization of the workforce. 
From an industrial relations perspective the movement from the corporatist 
model to the contractual model should have been cause for celebration. However, the 
unfortunate reality was that even with the theoretical change in the models applied 
there was no real change in the practical application of industrial relations concepts 
or principles. The reason is that the fundamental changes to the system did not 
result in a corresponding decrease in the levels of government intervention in the 
management of industrial relations, particularly with regard to employment terms 
and working conditions. The Government intervention in determining employment 
terms and working conditions remains a dominant feature of the Indonesian 
industrial relations landscape and this intervention continues to be maintained 
through the enactment of regulation. This means that where the contract model 
would normally provide increased scope for trade unions to be actively involved in 
the negotiation of employment and working conditions with employers has yet to 
occur in Indonesia. The consequences of this are: 
1.          Trade Unionists use their trade unions as a political tool to seek 
             higher office such as becoming members of Parliament or even the 
Minister of Labor. 
2.        Labor issues tend to be nationwide in nature and not regional or 
local. 
3.           Trade Unions no longer fulfill their primary task of negotiating 
      employment terms and working conditions through Collective  
     Labor Agreements. 
4.           Trade unions are more focused on the passage of legislation  
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through Parliament than on the needs of their respective 
members. 
The other new Law is Law No. 13 of 2003 on Labor. This Law is controversial 
for a number of reasons and paramount among these is that the law is deemed to be 
pro-employer and anti-employee. This was primarily reflected in the rejection of the 
Law by the trade unions en-masse and the acceptance en-masse by most employer 
associations and groups. Employers saw the Law as a means of consolidating their 
profits and increasing their margins. 
The arguments presented by trade unions for their rejection of the new law 
are: 
1.         The Law legalized “out-sourcing” which would have the effect of  
            reducing job security for Indonesian workers. 
2.  The Law legalized the “specified time contract” which was  
thought to jeopardize permanent employment security previously 
enjoyed by workers who would now be forced on to temporary or 
non-permanent work contracts.  
3.         The Law restricted the right to strike to specific types of labor 
          disputes. 
4.         The Law gives authority to employers to terminate their workers 
            for the alleged commission of a crime without the need to await a 
 binding criminal conviction to be handed down by the relevant 
court of law. 
5.         Some of the articles of the Law are inconsistent and as such  
Create   legal uncertainty. 
6.         Many others. 
In a somewhat perverse twist of fate the government through the 
Department of Labor is already moving to amend the law it went to great pains to 
pass through the House of Representatives just 3 years previously.  
The government’s commitment to amending the current labor laws and 
regulations, which are supported by the Employer Association, is because the 
current regulatory framework has been deemed not to be investor friendly. It is the 
view of the government that to attract further capital investment it is necessary to 
make the regulatory framework more investor friendly. However, in an interesting 
twist labor unions oppose any further amendments to the current law unless the 
proposed amendments are more labor friendly. This is interesting because when the 
current law came into force some 3 years ago the trade unions were opposed to the 
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provisions it contained. However, the government and Employer Association is 
proposing amendments that would impact directly on the conditions of specified time 
contracts, termination procedures, and severance payment calculations and the 
trade unions are vehemently opposed to any further amendment.  
In terms of legal substance Law No. 13 of 2003 to all intents and purposes re-
regulated employment terms and working conditions that had already been 
regulated elsewhere. It is somewhat ironic that Law No. 13 of 2003 repealed and 
replaced previous laws and regulations but it did not in fact change or amend the 
regulatory framework as all that was regulated in Law No. 13 of 2003 was already 
regulated elsewhere. 
The repetition of employment terms and working conditions which have 
already been regulated in Law No. 1 of 1951 on the Employment Act are20: 
1.         Prohibition against employing child labor.  
2.       Obligation to provide rest breaks and annual leave of at least 12 
days. 
3.         Working hours. 
4.         The rights and obligations of female workers. 
5.         among others. 
The repetition of employment and working conditions already regulated in 
Law No. 14 of 1969 on Fundamental Provisions of Labor are21: 
1.        The right of any prospective employee to gain  
employment without discrimination. 
2.        Equal rights or opportunities to choose or move to another job. 
3.        The right of any worker to form or to become a member of a trade 
     union. 
4.        The right to strike or lock-out. 
5.        The right of employees to acquire or to improve or to develop job 
           competencies through job training. 
The repetition of employment terms and working conditions can be seen in other 
labor regulations such as:  
1.         Government Regulation No. 8 of 1981 on Wages Protection22. 
a.    No work, no pay. 
b.    Exception of “No work, no pay”. 
c.    Minimum Wage. 
2.         Ministerial Regulation No. 2 of 1978 on Company Regulations23. 
a.  Obligation of the employer who employs more than 10 workers  
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must produce Company Regulations. 
b.    The content of Company Regulations. 
c.    Obligation to legalize the Company Regulations. 
3.        Ministerial Regulation No. 2 of 1993 on Specified Time Contract24. 
a.     The requirements of a Specified Time Contract. 
b.     The duration of a Specified Time Contract. 
c.     The ending of a Specified Time Contract.  
4.     Ministerial Regulation No. 150 of 2000 on the Termination of 
Employment and Severance Payments25. 
a.     The calculation of severance payments. 
b.     Wages component used to calculate severance payments. 
c.     The rights of the resigned worker. 
The repetition of employment terms and working conditions already 
regulated elsewhere, particularly Law No. 21 of 1954 on Collective Labor 
Agreements are: 
1.        The validity of the Collective Labor Agreement. 
2.        The extending of the validity of a Collective Labor Agreement. 
3.        The negotiation requirements of a Collective Labor Agreement. 
Based on the above analysis, Law No. 13 of 2003 was just another regulation 
to regulate employment terms and working conditions which had already been 
regulated previously in other instruments. Simply, the ability of the government to 
intervene in matters relating to the determination of employment terms and 
working regulations never changed. This currently remains the case.  
The promulgation of Law No. 13 of 2003 was followed by the promulgation of 
Law No. 2 of 2004 on Industrial Relations Disputes Settlement. This new law 
significantly changed the industrial relations disputes settlement framework by 
establishing a new mechanism for the resolution of industrial disputes. The new law 
required the parties to attempt to reach an amicable resolution to the dispute by 
entering into negotiations. If the parties cannot reach an amicable settlement the 
new regulatory framework requires them to enter into mediation or conciliation in 
an attempt to resolve the dispute. This alternative dispute resolution is a 
compulsory step that must be completed prior to the matter coming before the courts. 
The task of the conciliator and mediator to all intents and purposes are the same. 
Ultimately, the mediator or conciliator will hand down a decision however the 
parties are under no obligation to accept the decision of the mediator or conciliator. 
Where the parties do not accept this decision the matter is to be resolved through 
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traditional court-based mechanisms. For matters involving a conflict of interest or 
disputes between trade unions the Industrial Relations Court is a Court of First 
Instance and Appeal. This means that a right of appeal does not exist and the losing 
party cannot appeal to the Supreme Court. Especially for conflict of interest and 
trade union disputes, the parties can elect to undertake final and binding arbitration 
as the means of resolving their dispute. The decision of the arbitrator is final and 
binding. The parties are under an obligation to perform the decision of arbitrator26. 
However, for matters relating to employment rights and termination of employment 
a right of appeal exists. This means that a losing party may appeal to the Supreme 
Court.  
Although Law No. 2 of 2004 on Industrial Relations Disputes Settlement 
changed the labor dispute mechanism significantly it did not drastically impact upon 
the length of time required to have a dispute resolved, the mechanism still took a 
considerable period of time to navigate. The new mechanism encourages the parties 
to use the newly created Industrial Relations Court and avoid, at least theoretically, 
the mechanisms of voluntary arbitration. This is worth noting as voluntary 
arbitration is considered to be the best mechanism for accelerating the dispute 
resolution process. Even with new mechanisms in place it is still expected that most 
disputes will be appealed all the way to the cassation phase at the Supreme Court. 
The primary reason for the likelihood of appeals is that the alternative dispute 
mechanisms of mediation and conciliation are mandated under the law and must be 
completed prior to the dispute coming to court. Essentially, it is expected that the 
parties will go through the motions until their respective disputes reach the courts. 
The new law lessens the ability of government to intervene in the process and 
accelerate matters to a resolution. In this sense the new law can be characterized as 
weak with respect to dispute settlement..       
  Another new law promulgated by the government is Law No. 39 of 2004 on 
Migrant Worker Protection. In terms of substance all of the articles in this law are 
derived from the provisions contained in Ministerial Decree No. 104A of 2002 on 
Migrant Worker Protection. Therefore, it is fair to state that this Law is merely a 
restatement of the Ministerial Decree. A law, on face value, provides greater legal 
force however in a very real sense the purpose of Ministerial regulations and decrees 
is to give force of effect to a law and not vice versa. Migrant workers remained 
subject to a law which was heavily prejudiced against them.  
According to the new Law No. 39 of 2004 on the PJTKI (Labor Placement 
Companies)  these companies still possess the authority to recruit, to conduct labor 
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training, and to place the labor into an employment setting. The PJTKI also has an 
obligation to protect migrant workers before placement, during placement, and after 
placement28. The question is how can the PJTKI protect the migrant workers where 
the focus is on the recruitment, training, and eventual placement and not on the 
types of conditions the migrant worker may find on arrival? In a simple business 
sense where a PJTKI gets a contract to place 100 migrant workers, then the 
company’s goal is to place 100 migrant workers, no more and no less than the agreed 
number. Therefore, even where the law stipulates that the PJTKI is required to 
protect the workers it places the emphasis is rarely on this protection. It is clear that 
until there is stricter enforcement of the available provisions PJTKI will continue to 
focus on the recruitment, training, and placement concerns in preference to 
protection. The government has the ability to play a much stronger hand in 
enforcing the provisions as the law provides that the government is responsible for 
regulating and licensing PJTKI.   
The last new Law is Law No. 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security 
System. The purpose of this law, at least as the government sees it, is to develop a 
new National Social Security System, where all Care Takers of the Social Security 
Program are under the control of a  Social Security Board. In order to achieve this 
objective the National Social Security Board has the authority to supervise and to 
evaluate all Care Takers of the Social Security Program. The tasks of the National 
Social Security Board are29: 
1.            To observe or to do research on the implementation of social  
security program. 
2.            To propose policies on the investment of Social Security funds. 
3.            To propose the budget of donations for receivers of social security 
     dues and the operational budget for the government. 
4.           To harmonize the social security programs which have or are  
being implemented by a variety of care takers on social security. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION and ASSESSMENT 
 
 Based on the analysis above the following conclusions can reasonably be 
drawn from the available data:   
1.    Indonesian Labor Law reform since 1998 is notable for the 
ratification of all ILO Core Conventions. This has in turn 
encouraged the implementation of the Contractual Model. ILO 
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Conventions No. 87 and 98 and Law No. 21 of 2000 on Trade 
Unions are the legal basis for the Contractual Model.   
2.          The new Law No. 13 of 2003 on Labor maintains many of the old 
             regulations that were in force prior to 1998 meaning that 
          government intervention in determining employment terms and  
        working conditions remains a dominant factor. 
3.       The strong government intervention in determining employment 
terms and working conditions weakens the position of trade 
unions in the collective bargaining process. This was able to 
remain a factor because orientation of trade unions is more 
political than economic in nature. 
4.          The new Law No. 2 of 2004 on Industrial Relations Dispute 
             Settlement does not provide a sufficiently broad opportunity to 
the disputing parties to explore alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Unfortunately, this shortcoming is likely to 
metamorphose into an uncertain and lengthy legal process. 
5.          The new Law No. 39 of 2004 on Migrant Worker Protection still  
    does not sufficiently address the placement of migrant workers. 
The system is heavily prejudiced against migrant workers. The 
key provisions are a repetition of the previous provisions under 
the old regulation. 
6.          The new Law No. 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security 
         System has not made any significant changes and is in fact a  
      restatement of the previous regulation.   
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Vol. 7: No. 1001): 1002-1005. 
2 Ibid., 1008. 
3 Ibid., 1006. 
4 Ordinance on Restriction of Child Labor and Night Work for Women, Staatsblad No. 
647 of 1925. 
5 Law No. 1 of 1951 on the Employment Act. 
6 Law No. 2 of 1951on  Employment Accident. 
7 Law No. 3 of 1951 on Labor Supervision. 
8 Law No. 21 of 1954 on Collective Labor Agreements. 
9 Ministerial Decree No. 90 of 1955 on Trade Union Registration. 
10 Ministerial Decree No. 1 of 1975 on Trade Union Registration. 
11 Law No. 22 of 1957 on Labor Dispute Settlement 
12 Ordinance on Arbitration Staatsblaad No. 52/1847. 
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13 Law No.12 of 1964 on Termination of Employment in the Private Sector. 
14 Indonesian Civil Code, Staasblaad No. 23 of 1847. 
15 Law No.1 of 1970 on Labor Safety. 
17 Law No. 2 of 1993 on Social Security. 
18  ILO, Rules of the Game: A Brief Introduction to International Labor Standards, 
(Geneva: International Labor Standard Department, 2005), 12.  
19 Law No. 21/ of 2000 on Trade Unions. 
20 Compare: between Law No. 13 of 2003 on Labor and Law No. 1 of 1951 on the  
Employment Act. 
21 Compare: between Law No. 14 of 1969 on Fundamental Provisions of Labor and Law 
No. 13 of 2003 on Labor . 
22 Compare Law No. 13 of 2003 on Labor and Government Regulation No. 8 of 1981 on 
Wages Protection. 
23 Compare: Law No. 13 of 2003 on Labor and Ministerial Regulation No. 2 of 1978 on 
Company Regulations. 
24 Compare: between Law No. 13 of 2003 on Labor and Ministerial Regulation No. 2 of 
1993 on Specified Time Contract.  
25  Compare: between Law No. 13 of 2003 on Labor and Law No. 21 of 1954 on 
Collective Labor Agreements.  
26 Law No. 2 of 2004 on Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement. 
28 Law No. 39 of 2004 on Migrant Worker Protection. 
29 Law No. 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System. 
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